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This paper develops a general equilibrium model to 
analyze the marginal and joint impacts that alternative 
macroeconomic, education, and social protection 
policies have on the dynamics of employment and 
unemployment by skill level. The model introduces 
a disaggregated treatment of the labor market that 
incorporates an informal sub-sector in every sector of the 
economy.  The analysis explicitly models the distribution 
of skills in the labor force by following over time sex-
age cohorts across various levels of the education system 
and in the labor market. And it integrates a module that 
This paper—a product of the Human Development Department of the Middle East and North Africa Region and the 
Human Development Hub—is part of a larger effort in the department to better integrate/coordinate macroeconomic, 
social protection and education policies within a strategy for employment creation. Policy Research Working Papers are 
also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at drobalino@worldbank.org.
projects the revenues and expenditures of the pension 
system. The model is applied to the case of Morocco. 
Simulations show that even under positive assumptions 
regarding economic growth, unemployment rates are 
likely to remain close to current levels in the next decade. 
The paper argues that only an integrated package of 
policies that affect the macro-economy, the investment 
climate, and the education and social protection systems 
would allow sustainable creation of enough “good 
quality” jobs.  Assessing Interactions among Education, Social Insurance, and Labor 
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One of the main preoccupations of governments around the world is how to improve labor 
market outcomes,  both generating sufficient jobs for all members of the labor force and increasing 
the productivity, and therefore the earnings, associated with these jobs.  The problem is that there are 
multiple policies operating at various levels of the economy that affect labor market outcomes. These 
include macroeconomic and institutional policies that influence investments decisions, economic 
growth, and labor demand; education and training policies that affect the distribution of skills in the 
labor force; and, social protection policies that affect the bargaining power of workers, their mobility, 
as well as labor costs and the tax-wedge.
1   
Policymakers face several challenges when it comes to designing and implementing policies 
at these various levels because they need to accurately predict the joint effects that alternative policies 
have on labor market outcomes. It would also be interesting to transform/aggregate the changes in 
labor market outcomes into a measure of social well being. 
In terms of the link between policies and outcomes, two general approaches can be considered 
here. One is to conduct ex-post evaluations of a given policy intervention. These are powerful tools 
for guiding policymaking and are becoming more and more popular.  They usually refer, however, to 
specific, narrow, and well targeted interventions.  Their use is more limited when a comprehensive 
strategy – such as one to promote employment creation – is going to be conducted.  In the latter case, 
general equilibrium and macroeconomic effects are important and there is less room for “piloting” 
before implementation.  Ex-ante evaluations in this case remain important.  These involve the 
existence of an economic model linking policy levers to outcomes of interest. Unfortunately, the 
economics profession is still lacking an integrated framework that can be used to analyze labor market 
policies (see Fields, 2007).  There are still several questions to address in terms of what type of 
models should be used to link policies to outcomes; to complicate matters these tend to depend on the  
country context.       
                                                 
1 See for instance World Bank (2007) for a discussion on framework that integrates these policies. 
  2Coming up with a welfare function has also remained elusive. Some of the possibilities have 
been proposed by Lambert (1989), Squire (1981), Somavia (1999) and are reviewed in Fields (2001, 
2005 and 2007). When doing applied policy analysis, however, the form of the welfare function is 
likely to be very difficult to determine -- since it reflects social and cultural preferences.   
This paper is concerned with the first problem:  linking, ex-ante, policies and outcomes. The 
specific objectives are twofold. At the methodological level, the paper develops a general equilibrium 
model for the evaluation of integrated policy packages to promote employment creation. The model 
has been named SSELMA which stands for Social Security, Education, Labor, and the Macro-
economy.
2 The model presents innovations in the disaggregation of the labor market, the modeling of 
the supply of different skills, and the representation of the social insurance system.   
From a policy perspective, this paper uses the Moroccan case to address two questions.  First, 
how alternative education, SP, and macroeconomic policies affect key labor market outcomes 
including unemployment rates for workers with different levels of education.  Second, how the effects 
of integrated policy packages compare to the effects of partial policy interventions. In terms of 
education policies, the focus is on changes in internal efficiency: repetitions and dropout rates at 
various level of the education system.  Regarding social protection policies, the focus is on reforms to 
the pension system that affect the tax wedge.  Finally, macroeconomic policies focus on incentives to 
promote investment in high value added sectors, which is a recent policy in the country (see below).  
The paper starts by discussing the unemployment problem in the Moroccan case, the need for 
an integrated approach, and thus the rationale for a model such as SSELMA. It then introduces the 
main features of the model and describes, in general terms, the methodology used for calibration 
purposes.  The last two sections present the results of policy simulations and offer general conclusions 
regarding the main results of the analysis. 
I. Unemployment in Morocco and the Need for an Integrated Policy Framework 
Morocco is a country that has introduced several pro-growth structural reforms since the mid-
1990s. The country has achieved macroeconomic stability with low inflation, a strong external 
position and an ongoing fiscal consolidation.  Following a decade of per capita GDP growth close to 
                                                 
2 Selma means secure in Arabic and  is also the name of the Queen of Morocco but this is only a coincidence. 
  3zero, between 2001 and 2006, GDP per capita grew at an average of 2.5 percent per year.  In 2006, 
GDP grew at a rate close to 7 percent.    
Faster growth allowed the national unemployment rate to decline from 13 percent in 2000 to 
9.7 percent in 2006.  In urban areas the unemployment rate was reduced from 21.2 percent to 15.5 
percent. In general, the employment-creation intensity of the economy has been falling over the last 
few years. While between 1984 and 1990 a 1 percent increase in urban GDP was associated with a 
1.44 percent increase in employment, during the last years the same growth rate increased 
employment by only 0.35 percent. On one hand this is welcome as it reflects gains in labor 
productivity. On the other hand, it implies that faster growth will be necessary to absorb new entrants 
to the labor market.   
One challenge facing the government is that pressures on the labor market remain strong and 
economic growth might not remain at current levels. Today there are approximately 11.1 million 
individuals working or looking for a job in Morocco.  Although the country is ending the second 
phase of the demographic transition, the labor force is expected to grow at an annual 1.8 percent over 
the next 10 years.  This implies that there will be around 260,000 net new entrants to the labor force 
each year between now and 2020.  If the current unemployed are taken into account, Morocco would 
need to create around 3.85 million jobs by 2020 to eliminate unemployment. That is an average of 
295,00  jobs per year; whereas in the years before 2006 the number of jobs created each year did not 
surpass 190,000 .  If as a result of better access to education and lower fertility rates the change in 
participation rates accelerates (say converging to OECD levels in three decades), labor force growth 
could approach 2.5 percent per year. Yet, recent projections suggest that the GDP growth rate is 
actually going to slow down to 3.5 percent in 2007, a rate closer to the more modest historical 
average.  Medium-term projections building upon very favorable conditions suggest that Morocco 
would barely reach an average growth rate of 5.3 percent per year during the period 2007-2011 
(World Bank, 2006).   
The other problem is that the majority of the new jobs created are low-productivity and low-
skilled, many in the informal sector.  For instance, 90 percent of the jobs created since the year 2000 
went to individuals without higher education diplomas.  Also, the large majority (67 percent) of new 
  4jobs created since 2002 were in commerce and construction/public works sectors, which often tend to 
be informal jobs. The informal sector supplies 39 percent of non-agricultural jobs and 90 percent of 
jobs in the commerce sector. Another 10 percent of the jobs created where in agriculture. The 
agricultural sector still supplies 44 percent of the jobs and around half of those jobs are really unpaid 
on-farm family support.   
The other issue is the very high unemployment rates among young educated individuals, 
which co-exist with low levels of education in the labor force and skills shortages in strategic sectors.  
In 2005, 59.8 percent and 39.8 percent of those with post secondary education diplomas in the 15-24 
and the 25-34 age categories were unemployed.  This group will constitute more than one third of the 
new entrants to the labor market over the coming years.  At the same time, 35 percent of the labor 
force does not have formal education and 75 percent have less than secondary education.  Only 7.5 
percent of individuals in the labor force have higher education.  The problem is even more severe in 
the case of rural areas where 55 percent of the labor force does not have formal education and close to 
90 percent have less than secondary education.   
To deal with the unemployment problem, the government has recently launched many 
initiatives including the Program for the Promotion of Strategic Sectors
3. The program is part of a 
strategy to diversify the economy and promote competitiveness through investments in high value 
added and export oriented sectors. Around half a million jobs are expected to be created through this 
program by year 2020.   
In this paper we argue that this program alone is not the solution to the unemployment 
problem. The success of employment strategies will depend on the ability of the government to 
coordinate, implement and evaluate policies across sectors and through various agencies.  The 
reminder of this paper develops and uses an applied general equilibrium model to illustrate how a sub-
set of these policies would interact and affect employment dynamics and the future evolution of 
unemployment rates.  The focus is on policies that improve the internal efficiency of the education, 
promote productivity growth, control the tax wedge and contain the accumulation of unfunded 
                                                 
3 Programme d’Emergence. 
  5pension liabilities.  We also look at the interaction of these policies with the government Emergence 
Program.    
II. An Introduction to SSELMA 
A first attempt to develop an integrated framework dealing with labor market issues in Morocco was 
provided by Agenor and El Aynaoui (2003). Based on a modified version of IMMPA
4, the authors 
introduce Harris-Todaro type mechanism to determine the supply of unskilled labor in the formal 
sector and, a monopoly union approach to determine skilled workers’ wage in the private formal 
sector. The model takes into account internal and international migration. However IMMPA is quite 
stylized in terms of sectors and factors modeling. It is thus not suited for simulating the impact of a 
policy on a particular sector (Financial Sector for example) and does not allow to analyze the impact 
on a particular category of labor (technicians or university graduates for example). Moreover, it does 
not deal with social security reform (transfers to households are exogenous), does not take into 
account training and does not capture the demographic determinants of the labor market. Given our 
objectives, this tool was not fitted for analyzing the interactions between education, training, social 
security and employment policies. We thus had to develop a new framework for that purpose. 
SSELMA is a multi-sector, sequential dynamic general equilibrium model. The main 
innovative features of SSELMA are related to the modeling of the labor market, the supply of skills, 
and the representation of the social insurance system. Regarding the labor market, the model 
integrates an informal sub-sector in each sector of the economy (except agriculture). The model also 
takes into account labor market segmentation along the following dimensions: urban/rural, 
formal/informal, public/private, and permanent/temporary employment. In terms of the types of skills 
and their supply, the model includes a module that follows individuals over time across various levels 
of the education system and through several diplomas/specializations in post secondary education.
5  
In this version of the model the various skills supplied by the education system are aggregated into six 
skills categories (see Table 1). The model is also connected to a template that projects expenditures in 
the pension system by following over time the age/sex cohorts of contributors and retirees, their 
                                                 
4 See Agenor, Izquierdo and Jensen (2007) for a detailed presentation of the IMMPA framework. 
5 For a description of the HC accumulation model the reader is referred to Bodor, Robalino, and Rutkowski 
(2007). 
  6wages, and their pensions (the letter calculated according to specific policy rules or through 
replacement rates).
6 The model also opens the possibility to introduce unemployment insurance but 
the option is not used in the Moroccan case. 
In this section we focus mainly on the innovations of the model while describing very briefly 
the standard applied general equilibrium specifications.   
Table 1: Typology of Skills in the Model SELMA 
Typology of Labor Categories  Diplomas and Specializations Included 
Unskilled workers (un) 
No formal education or only Initial Training (i.e., 
VT diploma obtained where the only condition is 
to read and write). 
Low skilled workers type A (lsa)  Primary education + VT (specialilsation) or 9
th + 
VT.(qualification) or Secondary education only 
Low skilled workers type B (lsb)  Only primary education or 9
th grade 
Skilled workers (sk)  Secondary education + VT (Techniciens 
specialisés) 
Highly skilled workers type A (hsa)  Graduates from Grandes Ecoles and faculties 
with technical specializations. 
Highly skilled workers type B (hsb)  University graduates (except physicians) without 
a VT diploma 
Source:  Authors’ design.  The number of workers in each skill category by economic sector was provided by 




The production and factors demand block 
The economy is disaggregated into 20 sectors.  Within each sector, production factors are 
subdivided in 7 items: capital plus the six labor categories described above.  The production function 
is a nested one. At the highest level we assume that the production of each sector is a Leontief 
function of value added and total intermediate consumption. The demand for capital and the 6 skills 
levels is modeled through a nested CES function at 5 levels, which allows to have differentiated 
elasticities of substitution between the different factors.  Capital and highly skilled labor have been 
modeled relatively complementary, following the Fallon-Layard hypothesis (1975) which has been 
confirmed by various empirical studies.  Concerning the other bundles we have aggregated factors by 
pairs in CES bundles so as to have higher substitution elasticities between similar factors (for example 
                                                 
6 The basis of the template is the World Bank model PROST (see World Bank. 2005). 
  7the elasticity of substitution between university graduates and engineering schools graduates is higher 
than between these two categories and other labor categories).  
Value added is a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function of a capital-highly skilled 
labor bundle (KHS) and a low skilled labor-unskilled labor bundle (ULS). Through this function the 
relative demand of the bundles depends on the evolution of their relative prices (PKHS and PULS) 























































ULS KHS     (2) 
At the second stage, KHS and ULS are two CES functions of respectively capital (K) and a 
skilled-highly skilled labor demand bundle (HSK), and unskilled (un) and a low skilled labor demand 
bundle (LS). The first order conditions give us the derived demand of respectively K, HSK, un, and 












































































































LS LD       ( 6 )  
At the third stage, HSK and LS are respectively two CES functions of a composite highly 
skilled labor bundle (HS) and skilled labor (sk) and two low skilled categories lsa and lsb. The 











































































































LD LD      ( 1 0 )  
At the fourth stage, HS is a CES function of two highly skilled workers categories, namely hsa and 


















































LD LD      ( 1 2 )  
Finally, in the last stage, labor demand is disaggregated into two categories: permanent 
workers covered by the social security system and temporary workers excluded from it. For the 


















































     ( 1 4 )  
Wages of permanent workers include employers’ social security contributions (sce) and 
unemployment insurance (ui). We distinguish legal (lsce) and effective rates of contribution to social 
  9security (the difference λ is due to exemptions, evasion, etc.). The model also takes into account the 
cost of the implicit cost of severance pay, using as proxy an implicit unemployment insurance rate.   
We have: 
lf
lf lf lf lf
lf lf LD
TLD PLD ui sce
w awc
) * ) 1 (( + + +
=    (15) 
lf lf lf lsce sce * λ =       ( 1 6 )  
The labor supply block 
As mentioned above, one innovation in SELMA is the detailed projection of various skills 
levels based on repetition and drop-out rates at various levels of the education system, including 85 
combinations of diplomas and specialisations in higher education and vocational training.  There are 6 
skills levels associated with primary education depending on the grade an individual completed. 
Similarly 3 skill levels are associated with low secondary education and another 3 skill levels with 
upper secondary education. There are 9 skill levels associated with vocational training depending on 
the level of vocational training
7 (and the length of the vocational training (1 or 2 years).  In higher 
education the various areas of specialization,
8  combine with the length of study (varying between 2 
to 7 years depending on the specialization) and whether the education is provided by public or private 
institutions of higher education, thus generating 64 distinct skill levels within the model.   
  At each time t, these skills are aggregated into 6 types of labor.  Here we describe how we 
allocate the total supply of labour across economic sectors and formal/informal markets.  In essence, 
there are three stages.  In the first stage we model the migration process between the rural and urban 
labor markets. At the second stage, the urban labor market is divided into a formal and an informal 
segment. The informal labor supply is also then subdivided into independent workers and wage 
earners.  
At the first level, following Cogneau et al. (1996), the migration process from rural to urban 
areas is modelled through an extended Harris-Todaro function.  Thus, the relative supply of labor in 
                                                 
7 Certificat d'apprentissage, Spécialisation, Qualification, Technicien and Technicien  Spécialisé 
8 10 specializations altogether: Médecine Dentaire; Médecine et Pharmacie; Enseignement Originel; Sciences 
Juridiques, Economiques et Sociales; Lettres et Sciences Humaines; Sciences; Sciences et Techniques; 
Technologie; Sciences de l'Ingénieur; Commerce et Gestion
 
  10the urban (LSU) and rural (LSR) sectors is a function of the expected wage in the urban sector (auw) 
and the observed wage in the rural sector (nwr).  This function incorporates an elasticity of mobility 
(ε1) of labor from rural to urban areas.  The expected urban average wage is a weighted average of the 
wages in the urban sector (informal, formal private and public) multiplied by the probability of 
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where  TLDi and PLDi are the total labor demand of temporary workers and permanent 
workers in sector i, as defined above; nwii are wages in the informal sector, nwfi wages in the formal 
sector, and nwg the wage in the government sector.   
Regarding the split between formal and informal sector, we assume that the supply of labor in 
the latter results from a cost-benefit analysis made by workers and is not simply a residual.  This view 
is consistent with the recent empirical evidence that shows that informality is both the result of 
exclusion (the traditional view) and strategic decisions that respond to perceive benefits (e.g., 
flexibility, no taxation) and perceived costs (lower wages, lack of access to formal institutions).  In 
this framework, an increase in labor productivity in the formal sector or stronger public institutions 
would reduce informality by increasing the opportunity cost of not participation in the formal sector 
of the economy (see World Bank, 2007).  Thus, we model labor mobility between the formal and 
informal sector in the same way as we model mobility between rural and urban sectors:  the ratio of 
labor supply in the formal and informal sectors is a function of the expected wage in the formal sector 
and the observed wage in the informal sector.  The mobility elasticity (ε2 ), however is assumed to be 
lower than ε1 given that the cost of migration from the rural areas to the urban areas are likely higher 
than those related to the movement between informal and formal sectors.  We have: 
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In terms of wages we consider a disequilibrium framework:  wages do not clear the urban 
labor market. Following Cogneau et al. (1996), they are modelled as an extended wage curve
9. Thus, 
we assume that the average private wage by is a function of the unemployment rate, the public wage 
and the minimum wage
10. The following equation is thus estimated econometrically:   
u w gw afw 4 3 2 1 ) ln(min ) ln( ) ln( β β β β + + + =   (21) 
Sectoral wages by skill are then assumed to be equal to the average wages by skill defined above 
multiplied by an exogenous wage differential by sector and skill.  
PFORMU i fwdist afw wf i i ∈ = *        ( 2 2 )  
INFO i iwdist aiw wi i i ∈ = *     ( 2 3 )  
The formal labor force is split between independent workers and wage earners. We assume 
that the initial proportions of these two categories in the informal labor force are fixed.  
 
The social security block 
A social security account is modeled separated from the government budget.  The account receives 
employers and employees social security contributions (their total amount being endogenous) and 
pays benefits to households. The benefits are split into three components: old-age pensions, disability 
and survivorship pensions, and “other benefits”.  
                                                 
9 See Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) for a comprehensive presentation on wage curves. 
10 Minimum wages are set as a binding constraint. 
  12To determine the level of these benefits we run the PROST (Pensions Reform Options 
Simulation Tool) model
11 which feeds SSELMA with the evolution of dependency ratios and average 
replacement rates (the ratio between the average pension and the average wage in the economy).  
SSELMA uses these two inputs to compute total pensions and other social security expenses, which 
are proportional to the total wage bill.  
The income and expenditures block 
Households earn their income from wages, returns to capital, interests on bonds and transfers (mainly 
government and social security transfers and migrants’ remittances). Their expenditures are composed 
of consumption of goods and services, social security contributions, interest payments and transfers. 
The composition of their basket of goods and services is determined through the maximization of a 
Linear Expenditure System (LES) function under their budget constraint. 
The government earns income from various taxes (income taxes, corporate taxes, tariffs, 
production and consumption taxes) and from foreign transfers. Its expenditures consist of government 
consumption (mainly civil servants wages), social transfers and interest payments on public debt.  
The foreign trade block 
The allocation of output between domestic and foreign markets is modeled as a Constant Elasticity of 
Transformation (CET) function. On the demand side, the Armington assumption is adopted to 
describe imperfect substitution between domestic products and imports. The small country 
assumption holds for imports, which implies that world import prices are exogenous, however, an 
export demand function is modeled, which means that Moroccan exporters can reduce their prices if 
they want to increase their market share on international markets. 
The closures of the model 
SSELMA has 5 closures: a macro closure, a government closure, an external balance closure, 
a closure of the social security system and a labor market closure.  
Concerning the macro closure, this version of SELMA is savings driven (households’ marginal 
propensity to save is exogenous). The government closure chosen consists in fixing government 
                                                 
11 Developed by the World Bank Human Development Network.. 
  13expenditures (their growth rates) and tax rates and leaving the government budget balance 
endogenous to allow an assessment of the fiscal sustainability of the various scenarios. The foreign 
balance closure consists in fixing the exchange rate and leaving the current account balance 
endogenous to allow for the possibility of simulating the impact of exchange rate variation on the 
relevant variables. The social security balance is also endogenous. Finally the labor market closure of 
the SELMA model consists in a joint determination of unemployment and average formal wage 
through the wage curve described above.   
The dynamics of the model 
The model dynamics are of the sequential type. Capital accumulation is sectoral. Each year 
the stock of capital of each sector corresponds to the sum of the stock of last year and new investment 
minus the depreciation of capital. Following Bchir et al. (2002), sectoral investment (INVi) has been 
modeled as a function of the sectoral stocks of capital (KDi), sectoral rates of return to capital (rki) 





i i e KD gamma INV
− =
*
* *      ( 2 2 )  
gamma is an endogenous adjustment variable. It permits to ensure that total investment is equal to 
total savings. Sectoral investment increases with sectoral rates of return to capital, government 
subsidies and decreases with sectoral acquisition costs of capital.  
Yearly labor supply growth by skill is determined using the Human Capital projection 
model
12.  The HC model projects labor force by age, gender, and skill type based on mortality and 
fertility rates, labor force participation rates, and enrollment, repetition, and dropout rates at various 
levels of the education system.  
Government wages increase at a fixed rate set by the government. The other exogenous 
variables (mainly transfers) are supposed to vary each year at the same rate as GDP. 
III. Calibration of SSELMA in the Moroccan Context 
Due to the large number of parameters, calibrating a general equilibrium model remains an 
¨art.¨ Part of the calibration involves setting the initial value of macro-economic aggregates (e.g., 
                                                 
12 For a description of the model see Bodor, Robalino, and Rutkowski (2007). 
  14relative wages and the distribution of the labor force by sector) and this is usually straightforward 
when national accounts and labor force surveys are available. The other part, however, refers to 
unobservable parameters such as the elasticities of substitution in the production functions. One 
would like, for instance, to estimate the distributions of these parameters to replicate the statistical 
properties of known time series predicted by the model.  Such exercises have actually been conducted 
in the case of small ¨toy models¨ (see Abdelkhalek and Dufour, 2006), but are difficult to implement 
in the case of large scale models such as SSELMA. The model, however, is not intended to be used 
for prediction purposes. The more modest objective is to help the analyst understand the direction and 
order of magnitude of changes in output variables resulting from policy interventions, and how these 
policies interact, based on a set of reasonable assumptions regarding the value of the various 
parameters.   
 
Initial conditions 
The model was calibrated from a 2003 database for the Moroccan economy. The social 
accounting matrix (SAM) has been built on the basis of the national accounts provided by the 
Moroccan “Direction de la Comptabilité Nationale” and of the data from the labor force survey and 
the informal sector survey provided by the “Direction de la Statistique.” The SAM distinguishes 32 
activities (13 of which are informal) and 19 commodities. It is composed of 5 agents (Households, 
Firms, Government, Social Security and Rest of the World) and 7 factors (described above). The 
investment matrix has also been provided by the “Direction de la Statistique”.  
In terms of wages, the 1998 household survey was used (unfortunately, the most recent 2002 
household survey did not include information on earnings).  First, relative wages by skill level were 
estimated.  To this end, the various skills available in the survey were collapsed into the six skills used 
in the model and outliers drop from the survey. The relative wages where then used to calibrate initial 
average wages by sector, in order to replicate the total wage bill of the sector given the distribution of 
skills provided by the labor force survey.  
 
 
  15The parameters 
The elasticities of substitution and transformation of the CES and CET functions have been 
fixed a priori at “reasonable levels.”
13 For the production function elasticities we have for example a 
much lower elasticity between capital and highly skilled labor than between the other factors
14.   
The derivation of the scale and share parameters of the functions follows the usual procedure. 
Based on the initial values of the variables and exogenous parameters the scales/shares are computed 
endogenously.   
The parameters of the Human Capital accumulation model were estimated on the basis of data on 
student flows (enrollment, dropout, repetition and advancement rates) across different levels of the 
education system provided by the Ministry of Education. The flows are subject to change as the 
demographic composition of the population changes even if the transition variables of the education 
system remain constant.  
Finally, the parameters of the wage curve were estimated using time-series on wages provided 
by the “Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale” (CNSS). 
IV. Policy Simulations 
This section starts by presenting the dynamics of key macroeconomic aggregates under the 
status-quo or baseline scenario.  It then discusses the impact of alternative policy interventions in the 
education and social protection system, implemented individually or as a package (see Table 2). The 
focus is on the following aggregates:  (i) the growth rate of GDP; (ii) the level of investments; (iii) the 
fiscal deficit; (iv) the aggregate unemployment rate in urban areas ; (v) the size of the informal sector 
in terms of its contribution to total urban employment; and (vi) unemployment rates by skills level.  It 
is important to mention that the focus of the analysis is more on the direction of changes observed 
among the various output indicators than about the magnitude of the changes.    The tables with the 
results of the various simulations are presented in the Appendix.    
                                                 
13 See table A1 in the appendix 
14 Fallon and Layard (1975) hypothesis. 
  16Baseline dynamics 
In the baseline scenario the model is calibrated to project a real GDP growth rate that 
fluctuates between 5 and 6 percent per year – which basically replicates the official short-term 
projections.  Hence, GDP grows at 4.5 percent in 2007, increasing to 6 percent in 2010 and then 
fluctuating between 5 and 6 percent until year 2015 – the end of the simulation period.  The projected 
fiscal deficit, investment levels and the current account balance are also consistent with official 
projections (see Table A2).   
The results show that despite a positive outlook in terms of economic growth unemployment 
rates in urban areas would go down only very gradually. Hence, the model projects that the urban 
unemployment rate would first increase and remain constant at around 13 percent.
15  Only in year 
2010 it would start to gradually decline converging to 9.3 percent in year 2015.  These results are 
consistent with the aggregate projections that one would obtain assuming that the aggregate 
employment-output elasticity remains unchanged (see World Bank 2007, Chapter 2).  
The dynamics of unemployment rates are very different between skills categories; prospects 
are especially worrisome for Specialized Technicians. For unskilled workers, unemployment rates 
could rapidly converge to “natural levels.”  In part this occurs as their share among new entrants in the 
labor force diminishes.  For low-skilled workers unemployment rates are also on a downward trend 
although it would take them longer (around year 2015) to reach natural levels.  For highly skilled 
workers initial unemployment rates are higher and could increase over the short term, but would start 
declining after year 2010.  Still, by year 2015, 26 percent of university graduates in non-technical 
fields and 9.3 percent of graduates in technical fields would remain unemployed.  The situation is 
more critical, however, for Specialized Technicians.  They start with the highest unemployment rates 
(41.4 percent) but because of a rapid increase in their number, unemployment rates could continue to 
climb stabilizing at around 47.2 percent in year 2015. This result is driven of course by the 
                                                 
15 For consistency reasons, labor data in the model are in full-time equivalents, which means that the baseline 
unemployment rate is higher than the official one.  Indeed, employment and unemployment figures are 
presented in number of people mixing full time and partial time workers. In models we always transform the 
data in full-time equivalents because we cannot add someone who works one month and someone who works 9 
months. This means that our unemployment figures are also in full-time equivalents and thus higher than official 
ones. 
  17assumptions of the downward rigidity of wages that are not able to fall to stimulate labor demand 
sufficiently. 
The main message from the baseline scenario is that additional policy interventions would be 
necessary to reduce unemployment rates, particularly among high skilled workers. First there is a 
need to control student flows.  The current education/training system does not respond to market 
signals and therefore can oversupply certain skills.  The simulations indicate, for instance, that the 
current flows of Specialized Technician are simply too high for current demands.  But demand side 
interventions are also necessary to create more jobs at the aggregate level.  The next sections discuss 
the impact of some of these policies. 
Dynamics under alternative policy interventions 
The four sets of policies considered in the analysis are presented in Table 2.  The first set 
consists of policies that improve the technical efficiency of the education system.  In essence, 
reductions in drop-out and repetitions rates at various levels of the education system.  These affect the 
supply of various skills of labor through the Human Capital projection module.  Second, policies 
related to the social security system.  One is the absence of reforms in the pensions system that 
implies a continuous increase in the tax-wedge to cover expenditures. The other, is a reform program 
that gradually reduces replacement rates, which permits to reduce pension expenditures and thus to 
avoid an increase in workers’ contributions. The third set of policies is assumed to affect total factor 
productivity growth.  These policies could include improvements in the design of the continuous 
training system, better quality and relevance in higher education and vocational training, and/or those 
that support the adoption and diffusion of new technologies. Of course, we are not able to model the 
direct impact of this type of policies, but explore what would happen if, through their implementation, 
TFP increases. The fourth set of policies is related to the implementation of the current government 
programs to promote the development of high-value added economic sectors.  To this end we simulate 
the effects of higher investments in agro-industry, the financial sector, the mechanical industry and 
electronics. 
  18 The simulations look at the marginal impacts of each of the policy packages, as well as their 
joint effects.      
Table 2:  Description of Policy Simulations 
Policy Simulation  Mechanism 
A. Improvement in internal efficiency 
of education system.  
Repetition, dropouts, and enrollment rates improve by 50 
percent at all levels of the education system.   
B Policy A with higher total factor 
productivity growth. 
the growth rate of TFP increases by 20 percent (e.g., from 1 
percent per year to 1.2 percent per year). 
C. Failure to reform social security  A 10 percent increase of the average effective contribution 
rate per year is assumed (e.g., from 10 percent to 11 percent)  




It assumes that the pension system is reformed and that 
average replacement rates are reduced over time The 
contribution rate to the social security remains constant. 
E. Support to emergent sectors 
(Agroindustry)  10 percent subsidy to the acquisition costs of capital.   
F. Support to emergent sectors 
(Financial sector)  Same as before 
G. Support to emergent sectors 
(Mechanical Industry and 
Electronics) 
Same as before 
H. Support to emergent sectors 
(D+E+F)   The subsidy is applied to the four sectors simultaneously 
I. Integrated package (B+D+H)  All “shocks” are introduced simultaneously 
Source:  Authors’ design. 
Education and training policies.  An important insight from the simulations is that simply 
improving internal efficiency at various levels of the education system might not contribute much to 
growth or employment creation. In theory, better internal efficiency would imply a higher stock of 
human capital, lower labor costs for skilled workers and faster GDP growth over the long term.  
However, the simulation of a policy that increases internal efficiency across education levels shows 
that the impacts on GDP growth would be negligible over the short and medium term (between 0.1 
and 0.3 percentage points).  The effects on the aggregate unemployment rate would also be small at 
least until year 2011 when it could be reduced by 0.5 percentage points (see Table A3). 
On the contrary, the simulations show that unemployment rates could increase for some 
individuals, depending on their skills.  The relative effects are complex and depend on demographics 
                                                 
16 The reform is composed of the following elements: review benefit formulas and eligibility conditions in order 
to ensure financial sustainability; and eliminate incentives for evasion and early retirement; make redistribution 
transparent and progressive; and  ensure the full portability of benefits across pension funds and, to the extent 
possible, identical provisions. 
  19(which affect the supply) and on the structure of the production function (which affect the demand).  
The model shows that internal efficiency alone could hurt unskilled and highly skilled workers, and 
be beneficial for those in the middle. 
  Unemployment rates could increase among unskilled workers at the benefit of low skilled 
workers without VT diplomas.  Indeed, higher internal efficiency at all levels of the education sector 
reduces the supply of unskilled workers and therefore drives up their wages. Because they become 
more expensive relative to low skilled-workers, particularly those without VT diplomas, a substitution 
effect takes place. Hence, unskilled workers (un) loose jobs while low skilled workers without VT 
diploma (lsb) gain jobs. Unemployment rates for the latter could be reduced significantly over the 
medium and long term.   
A similar story can be told about workers with only secondary education or 9
th grade plus VT 
(lsa). Indeed, lower dropout rates reduce the number of individuals who drop out of primary education 
and/or before completing 9
th grade and obtain a VT diploma, or enter the labor market with only 
secondary education. This increases their wages and therefore firms have incentives to substitute them 
for skilled workers (secondary + VT).  In this scenario, employment prospects for the latter could 
improve -- even if their salaries also go up as a result of lower supply reflecting a lower dropout rate 
at the Baccalauréat.  
 For highly skilled workers (hsa and hsb) the situation is different.  Higher internal efficiency 
implies a rapid increase in the number of university graduates.  Even if their salaries initially go down 
and they can be substituted for skilled workers, downward rigidities put a limit to the demand given a 
level of output.  Hence, without faster economic growth new highly skilled workers entering the 
market simply can not be absorbed.   
Total factor productivity.  What would happen if total factor productivity increases as a 
result of: (i) better quality of education and more relevant diplomas/specializations in higher 
education and VT; (ii) better incentives to invest in training within enterprises; and (iii) other policies 
that affect innovation.  In the simulations, the combined effect of these policies is assumed to increase 
the growth rate of total factor productivity growth rate by 1/5
th of its baseline level.  This increases 
investments and the demand for labor at a given wage.  The results show important improvements 
  20both in terms of economic growth and employment creation.  GDP growth could increase by 1 
percentage point over the short term and 1.3 percentage point over the medium term. The aggregate 
unemployment rate could be reduced by up to 2.6 percentage points (see Table A4).  Unemployment 
rates by types of labor would fall for most types of labor, bringing down the aggregate unemployment 
rate relative to the baseline.  The exceptions are highly skilled workers.  With the assumed increase in 
TFP, the unemployment for university graduates with technical specializations could be reduced in 
the short term but would still be higher than in the baseline over the medium term, but much lower 
than in the previous scenario. The increase in unemployment for this category means that the 
demographic and educational effects on labor supply are stronger than the productivity and growth 
effect on labor demand for this category of workers. In essence, even with the higher rate of output 
growth generated in this scenario the economy would not be able to absorb the flow of qualified 
individuals.  Again, this result is driven by the assumption of wages downward rigidity.  
 This would seem to contradict the observation in Morocco that in certain high value added 
sectors there are shortages of technical professionals.  These shortages, however, could still exist for 
specific diplomas/specializations even with a high unemployment rate for the broader class of skills 
used here.  Nonetheless, one of the policy interventions analyzed below looks at the effect of the 
expansion of some of these strategic sectors.  
Social security reform.  The simulations show that failing to reform the social security 
system and allowing social security contributions to increase can aggravate the unemployment 
problem.  The simulation discussed here focuses on the pension system.  It considers a gradual 
increase in the contribution necessary to make the pension system solvent – around a 10 percent 
increase per year during 5 years.  This is the contribution rate that is necessary to ensure that current 
liabilities are equal to expected assets (including the pay-as-you-go asset)
 17 even if today it increases 
the surplus of the pension system.  The results show that higher contribution rates could increase the 
aggregate unemployment rate by 2.5 percentage points over the medium term (see Table A5).   
                                                 
17 The pay-as-you-go asset is equal to the present value of future contributions net of the pension rights accruing 
from those new contributions. 
  21Contrary to common belief, higher pay-roll-taxes and/or workers contributions could mainly 
affect highly skilled workers with technical specializations and workers with secondary education or 
intermediate levels of vocational training. These groups would face the sharpest reductions in 
employment levels and therefore the highest increases in unemployment rates -- close to 4 percentage 
points by year 2010.  On the contrary, unskilled workers would be the least affected.  There are two 
factors that explain these results.  First, a portion of the unskilled and low skilled workers is likely to 
enter the informal sector (see below).  Second, due to the fact that unskilled workers reach their 
natural unemployment level in 2012 (due to demographic and educational dynamics), there is much 
less pressure on low skilled workers which are relatively more substitutable than skilled workers.  
The higher cost of labor would also induce a mild expansion of the informal sector.  Indeed, 
unskilled workers who do not find a job in the formal sector fill the ranks of those working in the 
informal sector.  However, the increase in the contribution of the informal sector to total urban 
employment would be modest, starting with 0.1 percentage point and converging to close to one 
percentage point.   
On the contrary, reforming the pension system by gradually aligning benefits with 
contributions does not have a negative impact on employment creation.  In the simulation, this 
assumes that pay-roll taxes and workers contributions stay constant at current levels, the social 
security surplus increases while the effects on growth are insignificant (Table A6). However, given 
the issue of financial sustainability of the social security system, and the necessity of a reform, this 
option seems more desirable if we take into account the objective of unemployment reduction. 
 Support to emergent sectors.  The results of the analysis indicate that each sector on its 
own will have little effects on economic growth and unemployment.  The stimulus subsidy in the 
agro-industrial sector would have no impact over the short-term and very little impact over the 
medium term. The growth rate of GDP could increase by 0.1 percentage point and unemployment 
rates for some skills categories could be reduced by a similar amount (Table A7). No sizable effects 
would take place on the aggregate unemployment rate.  The stimulus in the mechanical and 
electronics industrial sector could even have negative effects. Basically, the cost of the subsidy, which 
reduces government savings and aggregate investments, would be higher than the benefits in terms of 
  22more investment and growth in the sector (Table A8).  More promising results can be observed in the 
financial sector. The subsidy there could increase the GDP growth rate by 0.4 percentage point in 
2008 and about 0.8 percentage point in 2015.  Reductions in the unemployment rate would be modest, 
between 0.2 and 0.3 percentage points (see Table A9).  
 The combined effect of the investment subsidy in the three sectors considered here would 
only add around 200,000 new jobs between 2007 and 2015. The almost totality of these jobs would be 
created through the stimulus in the financial sector.  The stimulus in agro-industry would generate less 
than 10,000 jobs and the net impact in the mechanics and electronics industrial sector would be nil.  
Yet, the stimulus package would increase the government deficit by 0.2 to 0.5 percent of GDP over 
the short term (see Table A10). 
The main message here is that the Government would need to be conservative in terms of the 
direct impact that the Emergence Program has on employment.  Clearly, there is a need to analyze the 
impact of the stimulus package on other sectors, but in general, it seems that reaching the target of 
500,000 new jobs would require considerable public resources.  As discussed in World Bank 2007 
(Chapter 1), the value added of the Emergence Program could be more in terms of its impact on 
economic diversification, and through this channel, innovation/self-discovery and productivity 
growth. These effects were not captured in the simulations. The important role of productivity growth, 
however, was illustrated above.     
An integrated package.  Not surprisingly, an integrated package that combines the various 
policies discussed above can have important impact on economic growth and employment creation.  
More specifically, this policy package would include improved internal efficiency in the education 
system, higher growth in total factor productivity resulting from policies that promote innovation 
within firms, social security reforms that keep pay-roll taxes constant and increase domestic savings, 
and the support to high-value added emergent sectors.  Under this package, GDP growth could 
accelerate above 6.5 percent per year. Its level is higher by 1 percentage point to its reference scenario 
level during the whole investigation period. The aggregate unemployment rate would be reduced by 3 
percentage points in the medium run (Table A11).  Highly skilled unemployment will continue to 
  23increase due to the high pace of increase of the number of graduates (mainly under the scenarios A 
and B), but in the integrated scenario this increase is lower. 
V.  Conclusions 
This paper has introduced the dynamic general equilibrium model SSELMA (Social Security, 
Education, Labor, and the Macro-economy).  The model was designed to help analysts to better 
understand how macroeconomic, education, and social protection policies interact to affect the 
dynamics of employment.  The strength of the model relative to other models of its kind is the high 
resolution of the labor market (including the inclusion of a formal and informal sub-sector in all sector 
of the economy but agriculture), the inclusion of a social security module to project pension 
expenditures, and a human capital accumulation model that predicts the distribution of skills in the 
labor force.   
Like any model, SSELMA remains open to refinements.  One of the main challenges is to 
validate empirically the appropriateness of selected functional forms and model parameters.  Two 
critical modules are those determining the dynamics of the labor force between urban and rural areas 
and the formal and informal sectors, as well as the demand for various skills levels.   
The model was used to illustrate the impact that alternative education and social protection 
policies have on selected macroeconomic aggregates.  The ones considered here include:  GDP 
growth, the fiscal balance, the aggregate unemployment rate, unemployment rates by skill level, and 
the size of the informal sector. The results presented provide several insights. 
The simulations first confirm that, even under optimistic scenarios regarding economic growth 
high unemployment rates in urban areas would persist, particularly among high skilled workers.  The 
baseline scenario in the model projects GDP growth rates between 5 and 6 percent.  These are barely 
enough to bring down the urban unemployment rate below the 10 percent barrier in year 2015.   
Setting aside the issue of skills mismatch,
18 the current economy seems unable to absorb current flows 
of skilled and highly skilled workers.  Both skilled and highly skilled workers face the highest 
                                                 
18 These are not modeled within SELMA. 
  24unemployment rates.
19  The projections show that for skilled workers these are likely to increase 
approximating 50 percent over the medium term.  For highly skilled workers unemployment rates 
could increase over the short term and eventually fall over the medium term, but would remain above 
25 percent for non-technical specializations and 10 percent for technical specializations. 
The simulations also suggest that simply improving internal efficiency in the education system 
could make things worse.  Higher internal efficiency in the education system is a pre-condition to 
sustain the accumulation of human capital over the medium and long term and support economic 
growth. But having more people graduating from university does not automatically mean higher 
aggregate productivity and faster growth.  Over the short and medium term, the higher inflow of 
skilled workers would contribute to increased unemployment rates.  Unskilled workers would also be 
affected as their number is reduced, their wages go up, and then get substituted by more skilled 
workers.  
In the scenarios considered the model predicts that not reforming the social security could cost 
much more jobs than the Emergence Program could create under its best performance.  Not reforming 
the pension system and/or not controlling the finances of the new health insurance system and letting 
pay-roll taxes and social security contributions increase would have a negative effect on employment 
levels. The aggregate unemployment rate could increase by up 2.5 percentage points as a result of a 
10 percent increase in the contribution rate over a period of 5 years.  Effects are particularly important 
for highly skilled workers for whom unemployment rates could increase by up to 4 percentage points.   
The model also warns about having high expectations regarding the effects of the Emergence 
Program.  The stimulus package simulated in three sectors (agro-industry, financial sector, and 
mechanical and electronic industry) generated only 200,000 new jobs between 2007 and 2015 at a 
cost of 0.2 to 0.5 percent of GDP per year.  If these ratios are preserved, the 500,000 target that the 
government has set could cost each year between 0.5 percent and 1.25 percent of GDP.   
But probably the most important message from the analysis is that isolated interventions will be 
insufficient to reduce unemployment. Each of the policy interventions simulated here can affect 
                                                 
19 In our application, skilled workers refer to individuals who have a diploma of Specialized Technician from 
the VT system.  Highly skilled workers, on the other hand, refer to university graduates, which the model 
separates into technical and non-technical diplomas.   
  25unemployment rates on its own, but the effects tend to be modest.  A sustained reduction in 
unemployment rates requires an integrated and well coordinated package of policy interventions. We 
argue that an integrated package that can rapidly reduce unemployment rates for all categories of 
workers would seek the following general objectives: (i) foster total factor productivity growth 
through better quality and the improved relevance of the diplomas/specialization supplied by the 
higher education and VT system, as well as better incentives to invest in in-service training; (ii) 
increase investments and promote faster growth in sectors intensive in highly-skilled workers; and 
(iii) reform the social security system to control labor costs.  Such a package could also reduce the 
size of the informal sector, which implies an improvement in the average quality of the jobs created. 
The challenge of course is to identify the specific policies that would achieve these objectives. Several 
are discussed in a recent report on skills development, social protection, and employment in Morocco 
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  27Appendix 
 
Table A1: main elasticities of the model 
Elasticity of substitution between imports and local products  1.5 
Elasticity of transformation between local products and exports  1.5 
Elasticities of substitution   
-between a capital-highly skilled labor bundle (KHS) and a low skilled labor-
unskilled labor bundle (ULS).  
0.5 
-between capital (K) and a skilled-highly skilled labor demand bundle (HSK)  0.4 
- between unskilled labor (un) and a low skilled labor demand bundle (LS)  0.7 
- between a composite highly skilled labor bundle (HS) and skilled labor (sk)  0.8 
-between two highly skilled workers categories, namely hsa and hsb.   0.85 
-between two low skilled categories lsa and lsb.  0.9 
-between temporary and permanent labor  1.5 
 
 
Table A2: The Baseline Scenario 
Macro Results  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
GDP Billion Dh  516.9 543.3 573.6 608.6 640.4 677.1 718.4 764.3 814.6 
GDP Growth  4.6% 5.1% 5.6% 6.1% 5.2% 5.7% 6.1% 6.4% 6.6% 
Government Balance Billion  Dh  -0.8  -0.1 0.8 2.0 3.0 3.9 5.0 6.3 7.5 
Social Security Balance Billion  Dh  7.90 7.73 7.41 6.99 6.39 5.63 4.64 3.48 2.07 
Total investment Billion  Dh  147.7 161.0 177.4 197.3 215.0 234.8 257.4 282.7 310.0 
Total Unemployment  12.7% 13.1% 12.8% 11.9% 11.5% 11.1% 10.6%  9.9%  9.3% 
Share informal labor supply  23.7% 23.5% 23.4% 23.2% 23.1% 23.1% 23.1% 23.1% 23.2% 
Total Urban labor supply (Million)  9.74  10.09 10.41 10.70 10.97 11.22 11.45 11.66 11.86 
Unemployment           
un  6.0% 5.8% 5.0% 3.5% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 
lsb  12.5% 12.3% 11.8% 10.9% 10.0%  8.6% 6.9% 4.7% 3.0% 
lsa  12.2% 12.2% 11.6% 10.2%  8.9% 7.0% 4.7% 3.0% 3.0% 
sk  41.4% 44.1% 45.7% 46.5% 47.1% 47.5% 47.6% 47.5% 47.2% 
hsb  32.9% 33.4% 33.2% 32.7% 32.2% 31.3% 29.9% 28.1% 26.0% 
hsa  16.5% 18.7% 18.5% 17.6% 17.0% 15.7% 14.3% 12.0%  9.3% 
 
 
  28Table A3: Improving Internal Efficiency in the Education System (Policy A) 
 
Variation in % compared to the reference 
scenario            
Macro  Results    2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
GDP   0.1% 0.1% 0.1%  0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 
GDP Growth (percentage points)  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% -0.1%  -0.1% 
Government Balance 
-
2.6%  -25.8%  4.1% 1.9% 5.2% 4.8% 3.6% 1.0% -1.2% 
Social Security Balance   0.1%  0.2%  0.2% 0.2% -0.3% -0.4% -0.3% 0.4%  1.7% 
Total investment   0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.3% -0.1% 
Total Unemployment (percentage points)  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% -0.5% -0.5% -0.4% 0.3%  0.9% 
Share informal labor supply (percentage points)  0.2%  0.2%  0.1% 0.1%  0.0% -0.2% -0.2% -0.3% -0.4% 
Unemployment (percentage points)           
Un 1.5%  1.7%  1.7%  1.6%  0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 




1.0%  -1.6% -2.1% -2.8% -1.7% 0.0% 







9.0% -9.3% -9.5% -9.6% -9.5% -9.3% 

















Table A4: Internal Efficiency and Faster Total Productivity Growth (Policy B) 
 
Variation in % compared to the reference 
scenario             
Macro  Results    2007  2008  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
GDP   3.3% 4.3%  5.5%  6.7%  7.9% 9.2%  10.3%  11.4%  12.5% 
GDP Growth (percentage points)  0.9% 1.0%  1.2%  1.2%  1.1% 1.3% 1.1% 1.1% 1.0% 






%  89.3% 77.7% 67.4% 60.1% 
Social Security Balance   1%  1%  2% 2% 3% 3% 2% 0% -9% 
Total investment   8.2% 10.6% 
13.1
%  15.3% 17.2% 19.0% 20.5% 21.5% 22.3% 
Total Unemployment (percentage points)  -1.4%  -1.9%  -2.6% -2.6% -2.5% -2.4% -1.8% -0.9% -0.2% 
Share informal labor supply (percentage 
points)  0.1%  0.0%  -0.1% -0.2% -0.2% -0.3% -0.3% -0.2% 0.0% 
Unemployment (percentage points)             
Un  0.1%  -0.3% -1.0%  -0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Lsb  -1.2%  -1.9%  -2.8% -4.1% -5.4% -5.6% -3.9% -1.7% 0.0% 
Lsa  0.3%  0.6%  0.7% 0.6%  0.5%  0.2% -0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 
Sk -9.3%  -10.3% 
-
11.1









Hsb 1.4%  2.3%  3.7%  6.9%  9.8%  12.6% 15.1% 17.6% 20.1% 
Hsa  0.2%  0.1% -0.3%  -0.6% -0.1% 0.3% 1.6% 3.0% 4.6% 
 
 




Variation in % compared to the reference 
scenario            
 
Macro Results   2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015 
GDP   0.5% 0.6% 0.8%  1.2%  1.3% 2.1% 2.8%  3.5%  4.4% 
GDP Growth (percentage points)  0.2% 0.2% 0.2%  0.4%  0.2% 0.8% 0.7%  0.8%  0.9% 







% -2.7%  3.0%  5.4% 7.5% 10.4% 
Social Security Balance   65% 109%  167%  245%  284%  345%  452%  652%  1191% 




%  14.0% 14.8% 15.7%  16.9% 
Total Unemployment (percentage points)  0.9% 1.4% 2.0%  2.5%  1.9% 1.1% 1.0%  0.9%  0.4% 
Share informal labor supply (percentage 
points)  0.1% 0.2% 0.3%  0.4%  0.4% 0.5% 0.6%  0.7%  0.8% 
Unemployment (percentage points)              
Un 0.9%  1.4%  1.9%  2.4%  1.4% 0.0% 0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Lsb 0.8%  1.3%  1.8%  2.2%  2.2% 2.0% 1.7%  1.5%  0.4% 
Lsa 1.4%  2.3%  3.1%  4.0%  4.0% 3.9% 3.6%  2.3%  0.0% 
Sk 0.9%  1.4%  1.8%  2.2%  2.0% 1.8% 1.6%  1.5%  1.3% 
Hsb 1.1%  1.7%  2.3%  2.9%  2.8% 2.6% 2.4%  2.3%  2.1% 
Hsa 1.5%  2.2%  3.0%  3.9%  3.7% 3.5% 3.3%  3.2%  3.0% 
 
 
Table A6: Reforming the Social Security (Policy D) 
 
Variation in % compared to the reference 
scenario               
Macro  Results    2007  2008  2009  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014  2015 
GDP   0.0%  -0.1%  -0.1%  -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% -0.1%  0.0% 
GDP Growth (percentage points)  0.0%  -0.1%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 
Government Balance  5.1%  26.5%  -3.7%  -1.7% -0.9% -0.7% -0.6% -0.4%  5.1% 
Social Security Balance   3.8% 3.5% 4.6%  5.3%  5.6% 5.8% 6.0% 5.8%  3.8% 
Total investment   0.2%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -0.1%  -0.1%  0.2% 
Total Unemployment (percentage points)  0.0% 0.1% 0.1%  0.1%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 
Share informal labor supply (percentage points)  0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 
Unemployment (percentage points)               
Un  0.0%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Lsb  0.0%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 
Lsa  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
Sk  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
Hsb 0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
Hsa 
  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
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Table A7: Stimulus to the Agro-Industrial Sector (Policy E) 
 
Variation in % compared to the reference 
scenario              
Macro  Results    2007  2008  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013  2014 2015 
GDP   0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%  0.1% 0.2% 
GDP Growth (percentage points)  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 










10.0%  -8.8% -8.2% 
Social Security Balance   0%  0%  0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  0% 0% 
Total investment   0.0%  0.1%  0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4%  0.4% 0.4% 
Total Unemployment (percentage points)  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  -0.1% 0.0% 
Share informal labor supply (percentage 
 points)  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 
Unemployment (percentage points)              
Un  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Lsb  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -0.1%  -0.1%  -0.1% 0.0% 
Lsa  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% -0.2% 0.0%  0.0% 
Sk  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -0.1%  -0.1%  -0.1%  -0.1% 
Hsb 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  -0.1%  -0.1%  -0.1%  -0.1%  -0.1% 
Hsa  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% -0.1%  -0.1% -0.2% 
 
 
Table A8: Stimulus to the Financial Sector (Policy F) 
 
Variation in % compared to the reference 
scenario           
Macro  Results    2007  2008  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
GDP   0.0% 0.4%  0.4%  0.5%  0.5% 0.6% 0.7% 0.7% 0.8% 
GDP Growth (percentage points)  0.0% 0.4%  0.0%  0.1%  0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 















Social Security Balance   0%  0%  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Total investment   0.0% 1.2%  1.5%  1.6%  1.6% 1.7% 1.8% 1.8% 1.7% 
Total Unemployment (percentage points)  0.0%  -0.2%  -0.3% -0.3% -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% -0.1% 
Share informal labor supply (percentage 
points)  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% 
Unemployment (percentage points)             
Un  0.0%  -0.2% -0.3%  -0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Lsb  0.0%  -0.2%  -0.2% -0.3% -0.3% -0.4% -0.4% -0.6% 0.0% 
Lsa  0.0%  -0.3%  -0.3% -0.4% -0.5% -0.6% -0.7% 0.0%  0.0% 
Sk  0.0%  -0.1%  -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% 
Hsb  0.0%  -0.2%  -0.2% -0.3% -0.3% -0.4% -0.4% -0.5% -0.5% 
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Variation in % compared to the reference 
scenario             
Macro  Results    2007 2008  2009  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
GDP   0.0% -0.1%  -0.2%  -0.2% -0.2% -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% -0.3% 


















Social Security Balance   0% 0%  0%  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 
Total investment   0.0% -0.4%  -0.6%  -0.8% -0.8% -0.9% -0.9% -0.9% -0.8% 
Total Unemployment (percentage points)  0.0% 0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Share informal labor supply (percentage 
points)  0.0% 0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -0.1%  -0.1% 
Unemployment (percentage points)             
Un 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.1%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Lsb 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 
Lsa 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Sk 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Hsb 0.0%  -0.1%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Hsa  0.0%  -0.1% 0.0% -0.1%  -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
Table A10: Stimulus to Agro-Industrial Sector, Financial Sector, and Mechanical and 
Electronic Industrial Sector (Policy H) 
 
Variation in % compared to the reference scenario               
Macro  Results    2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
GDP   0.0% 0.3%  0.3%  0.3%  0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 
GDP Growth (percentage points)  0.0% 0.3%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 

















Social Security Balance   0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 
Total investment   0.0% 0.9%  1.0%  1.1%  1.1% 1.2% 1.3% 1.4% 1.3% 
Total Unemployment (percentage points)  0.0%  -0.2%  -0.3%  -0.3%  -0.2% -0.2% -0.3% -0.3% -0.1% 
Share informal labor supply (percentage  
points)  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  -0.1%  -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% -0.2% -0.2% 
Unemployment (percentage points)               
Un  0.0%  -0.2%  -0.3% -0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Lsb  0.0%  -0.2%  -0.2%  -0.3%  -0.3% -0.4% -0.5% -0.6% 0.0% 
Lsa  0.0%  -0.3%  -0.4%  -0.5%  -0.6% -0.7% -0.8% 0.0%  0.0% 
Sk  0.0%  -0.2%  -0.2%  -0.3%  -0.3% -0.3% -0.4% -0.4% -0.4% 
Hsb  0.0%  -0.2%  -0.3%  -0.3%  -0.4% -0.5% -0.5% -0.6% -0.6% 
Hsa  0.0%  -0.3%  -0.3%  -0.4%  -0.5% -0.6% -0.7% -0.8% -0.8% 
 
 
Table A11: An Integrated Policy Package (Policy J) 
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Variation in % compared to the reference scenario               
Macro  Results    2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
GDP   3.3% 4.5% 5.6% 6.9% 8.1% 9.4%  10.7%  11.9%  13.0% 
GDP Growth (percentage points)  1.0% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.2% 1.3% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 
Government Balance 
137.5
%  507.4% -30.9%  -2.2%  3.4%  9.5% 10.1% 10.2% 9.5% 
Social Security Balance   5%  5%  6%  8%  9% 10%  10% 8% -3% 
Total investment   8.3% 11.5% 14.2% 16.3%  18.3% 20.2% 21.7% 22.7% 23.5% 
Total Unemployment (percentage points)  -1.3%  -2.0%  -2.7%  -2.7%  -2.7% -2.5% -1.9% -1.0% -0.2% 
Share informal labor supply (percentage points)  0.1% 0.0% -0.1%  -0.2%  -0.3%  -0.4%  -0.4%  -0.3%  -0.2% 
Unemployment (percentage points)               
Un  0.1% -0.5% -1.1% -0.5% 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Lsb  -1.1%  -2.0%  -3.0%  -4.3%  -5.7% -5.6% -3.9% -1.7% 0.0% 
Lsa 0.4%  0.3%  0.5%  0.3%  0.1%  -0.6%  -1.4%  0.0%  0.0% 











Hsb 1.4%  2.2%  3.6%  6.7%  9.6%  12.3% 14.8% 17.2% 19.8% 
Hsa  0.3% -0.1% -0.5% -0.9%  -0.4%  -0.2%  1.1%  2.3%  3.9% 
 